

Codebook RAI-MLG
Regional Authority Index (RAI v. 3)
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Citation for the dataset

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Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman Osterkatz, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2016). [Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume I](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press, xiv+ 687pp.

Data for the Regional Authority Index (RAI) v.3. are available in five different aggregations. RAI-MLG contains the most disaggregated and most comprehensive coding. It provides estimates for all regional tiers and all differentiated regions across 95 countries. Four datasets aggregate this information to a higher level or focus on subsets of regions. A codebook accompanies each dataset. **This is the codebook for RAI-MLG.**

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Table 1: Five RAI V.3 datasets

RAI-MLG	Annual scores for each individual region or regional tier from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a region–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, overall RAI. This is the master dataset that has a comprehensive record of all scores at the most disaggregated level.
RAI-Country	Annual scores for each country from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a country–year down in ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Region	Annual scores for the most authoritative regional tier from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a tier–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Metro	Annual scores for each individual metropolitan region or metropolitan tiers from 1950-2018. Each row breaks a metro–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.
RAI-Indigenous	Annual scores for each individual indigenous region or collective indigenous territorial arrangements from 1950-2018. Each row breaks an indigenous–year down into ten dimensions, two domains, and overall RAI.

A codebook accompanies each dataset. **This is the codebook for RAI-MLG.**

Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is the individual region which we define as a jurisdiction between national government and local government. We draw the boundary between local and regional government at an average population level of 150,000. This excludes the lowest tier of government, but allows us to capture intermediate governments, often arrayed at two nested jurisdictional levels between the local and national. We relax the population criteria for individual jurisdictions that stick out from a tier of government that meets the regional threshold, such as Greenland, or the Galapagos islands.

A regional jurisdiction may be part of a regional tier or self-standing. A regional tier may cover the entire territory or part of the territory. Jurisdictions that make up a regional tier may be contiguous or non-contiguous.

Special categories: indigenous and metropolitan governance

An indigenous region is a general purpose jurisdiction created with the explicit purpose to provide governance for an indigenous people or peoples.¹ A region is coded as indigenous when it meets the following criteria: a) it exists between the local level of government and the national level; b) the jurisdiction is codified in law. An indigenous region may or may not be contiguous, and it does not need to meet the population criterion.

A metropolitan region is a contiguous general purpose jurisdiction that combines one, two, or more cities and their surrounding municipalities to deal with issues stemming from conurbanization. A region is coded as metropolitan if it meets the following criteria: a) it exists between the local level of government and the national level; b) metropolitan jurisdictions within a country have on average a population of at least 150,000; and c) the jurisdiction is codified in law.

Differentiated regional governance

Each region is evaluated on whether its jurisdictional status is differentiated from that of standard regions at its tier. This differentiated status is almost always reflected in a different

¹ There is no generally accepted definition of an indigenous people. The UN permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues suggests the following: self-identification as an indigenous people; historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; a strong link to a territory and its natural resources; distinct social, economic, or political norms; a distinct language, culture, and beliefs; status as a non-dominant group of society; commitment to maintain and reproduce their ancestral heritage as a distinctive people (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf). In practice, the definition varies widely across countries. In settler states colonized by Europeans, it is usually unproblematic to pinpoint indigenous people, but in Asia and Africa, where the majority of the world's 250 to 600 million indigenous peoples live, it is often less clear where to draw the line and governments tend to exploit this gray zone to minimize their existence.

score on self-rule or shared rule from standard regions, or if there are no standard regions, in an anomalous status in the country.

A standard region is defined as follows:

- A *standard region* (S) is part of a regional tier. Standard regions have a uniform institutional set up. Hence, standard regions are scored in a tier (e.g. Changwat, Cantons, Länder), each of which has a separate entry in the dataset. Each year of evaluation has a separate row.

Our measure distinguishes three kinds of differentiated regions:

- An *asymmetric region* (Y) is embedded in a national tier, yet has distinctive authority on one or several dimensions of the RAI. Asymmetry is usually specified in one or more executive decisions, constitutional articles, or special clauses in framework legislation.
- An *autonomous region* (A) is exempt from the country-wide constitutional framework and receives special treatment as an individual jurisdiction. It operates mostly in a bilateral setting with the central state alone. The arrangement is laid down in a special protocol, statute, special law, or separate section of the constitution.
- A *dependency* (D) is not part of a standard tier, but is governed hierarchically by the central state. It has a separate government with no, or very little, authority.

Standard, asymmetry, autonomy, and dependency are mutually exclusive categorizations. All regions, including indigenous and metropolitan regions, are assessed on these criteria, and no region can have more than one categorization at a given time.

If a non-standard region becomes a standard region, it ceases to have a separate entry and is included in the standard tier. Conversely, a standard region that becomes non-standard acquires a separate entry from the year of its changed status.

Regional tiers and differentiated regions are evaluated on the same scale. We evaluate five dimensions of self-rule: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation. We evaluate five dimensions of shared rule: law making, executive control, fiscal control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform. There are two forms of shared rule. We code a region as having multilateral shared rule when its authority is contingent on coordination with other regions. We code a region as having bilateral shared rule when its authority is not contingent on coordination with other regions.

For a detailed discussion of the coding schema, please read:

Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Arjan H. Schakel, Sandra Chapman Osterkat, Sara Niedzwiecki, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield (2016). [Chapter Three: How We Apply the Coding Scheme](#). *A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance. Volume I: Measuring Regional Authority*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 58-107.

Table 2: Explanation of entries in excel file

VARIABLE NAME	RANGE	VALUES AND LABELS
cowcode	2-920	Correlates of War codes (http://www.correlatesofwar.org)
iso3166	8-891	International Organization for Standardization (ISO 3166-1)
countryid	1-152	Country ID (see table below)
country_name		Country name in English (see table below)
abbr_country		Abbreviation of country name
regionid	101-15212	Region ID (see table below)
region_name		Name of region in local language (see table below)
year	1950-2018	Year of evaluation
tier	1-5	1: highest tier 2: second tier 3: third tier 4: fourth tier 5: fifth tier
metro		1=metropolitan governance; 0=other
indigenous		1=indigenous; 0=other
type		S: standard region Y: asymmetrical region A: autonomous region D: dependent region
instdepth	0-3	The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated: 0: no functioning general-purpose administration at regional level 1: deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration 2: non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration subject to central government veto 3: non-deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration *not* subject to central government veto.
policyautonomy	0-4	The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible: 0: very weak authoritative competence in a), b), c), d) whereby a) economic policy; b) cultural-educational policy; c) welfare policy; d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set-up, local government 1: authoritative competencies in one of a), b), c) or d) 2: authoritative competencies in at least two of a), b), c), or d) 3: authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c) 4: criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration or citizenship.
fiscalautonomy	0-4	The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population: 0: central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes 1: regional government sets the rate of minor taxes 2: regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes

		3: regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added, or sales tax 4: regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax.
borrowautonomy	0-3	The extent to which a regional government can borrow: 0: the regional government does not borrow (e.g. centrally imposed rules prohibit borrowing) 1: the regional government may borrow under prior authorization (<i>ex ante</i>) by the central government and with one or more of the following centrally imposed restrictions: a. golden rule (e.g. no borrowing to cover current account deficits) b. no foreign borrowing or borrowing from the central bank c. no borrowing above a ceiling d. borrowing is limited to specific purposes 2: the regional government may borrow without prior authorization (<i>ex post</i>) and under one or more of a), b), c), d), e) 3: the regional government may borrow without centrally imposed restrictions.
representation	0-4	The extent to which a region has an independent legislature and executive, which is the sum of <i>assembly</i> and <i>executive</i> .
lawmaking	0-2	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine national legislation, which is the sum of <i>L1 to L6 (max=2)</i> .
executivecontrol	0-2	The extent to which a regional government co-determines national policy in intergovernmental meetings, which is the maximum value of <i>exec_multilateral</i> and <i>exec_bilateral</i> .
fiscalcontrol	0-2	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues, which is the maximum value of <i>fiscal_multilateral</i> and <i>fiscal_bilateral</i> .
borrowcontrol	0-2	The extent to which a regional government co-determines subnational and national borrowing constraints, which is the maximum value of <i>borrow_multilateral</i> and <i>borrow_bilateral</i> .
constitutional	0-4	The extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change, which is the maximum value of <i>constit_multilateral</i> and <i>constit_bilateral</i> .
selfrule	0-18	The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region, which is the sum of <i>instdepth</i> , <i>policyautonomy</i> , <i>fiscalautonomy</i> , <i>borrowautonomy</i> , and <i>representation</i> .
sharedrule	0-12	The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole, which is the sum of <i>lawmaking</i> , <i>executivecontrol</i> , <i>fiscalcontrol</i> , <i>borrowcontrol</i> , and <i>constitutional</i> .
RAI	0-30	Regional authority index, which is the sum of <i>selfrule</i> and <i>sharedrule</i> .
COMPONENTS		
instdepth	0-3	Same as <i>instdepth</i>
policyautonomy	0-4	Same as <i>policyautonomy</i>
fiscalautonomy	0-4	Same as <i>fiscalautonomy</i>

borrowautonomy	0-4	Same as <i>borrowautonomy</i>
assembly	0-2	0: no regional assembly 1: indirectly elected regional assembly 2: directly elected assembly
executive	0-2	0: regional executive appointed by central government 1: dual executive appointed by central government and regional assembly 2: regional executive appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected
L1lawmaking	0-0.5	0: a region or regional tier is <i>*not*</i> the unit of representation in a national legislature 0.5: a region or regional tier is the unit of representation in a national legislature
L2lawmaking	0-0.5	0: a regional government or regional tier does <i>*not*</i> designate representatives in a national legislature 0.5: a region or regional tier designates representatives in a national legislature
L3lawmaking	0-0.5	0: regions do <i>*not*</i> have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation 0.5: regions have majority representation in a national legislature based on regional representation
L4lawmaking	0-0.5	0: the legislature based on regional representation does <i>*not*</i> have extensive legislative authority 0.5: the legislature based on regional representation has extensive legislative authority
L5lawmaking	0-0.5	0: the regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are <i>*not*</i> consulted on national legislation affecting the region 0.5: the regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature are consulted on national legislation affecting the region
L6lawmaking	0-0.5	0: the regional government or its regional representatives in a national legislature do <i>*not*</i> have veto power over national legislation affecting the region 0.5: the regional government or regional representatives in a national legislature have veto power over national legislation affecting the region
exec_multilateral	0-2	0: no routine meetings between the central government and regional governments to negotiate policy 1: routine meetings between the central government and regional governments without legally binding authority 2: routine meetings between the central government and regional governments with legally binding authority
exec_bilateral	0-2	0: no routine meetings between the central government and the regional government to discuss national policy affecting the region 1: routine meetings between the central government and the regional government without legally binding authority

		2: routine meetings between the central government and the regional government with legally binding authority
fiscal_multilateral	0-2	0: neither the regional governments nor their representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of national tax revenues 1: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature negotiate over the distribution of national tax revenues, but do not have a veto 2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of national tax revenues
fiscal_bilateral	0-2	0: neither the regional government nor its representatives in a national legislature are consulted over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region 1: the regional government or its representatives in a national legislature negotiate with the central government over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region, but does not have a veto 2: the regional government or its representatives in a national legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues affecting the region
borrow_multilateral	0-2	0: regional governments are not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints 1: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints, but do not have a veto 2: regional governments negotiate routinely over borrowing constraints and have a veto
borrow_bilateral	0-2	0: the regional government is not routinely consulted over borrowing constraints affecting the region 1: the regional government negotiates routinely over borrowing constraints affecting the region, but does not have a veto 2: the regional government negotiates routinely over borrowing constraints affecting the region, and has a veto

constit_multilateral	0-4	<p>0: the central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the constitution</p> <p>1: a legislature based on regional representation can propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum</p> <p>2: regional governments or their representatives in a national legislature propose or postpone constitutional reform, raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, or require a popular referendum</p> <p>3: a legislature based on regional representation can veto constitutional change; or constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal regional representation</p> <p>4: regional governments or their representatives in a legislature can veto constitutional change</p>
constit_bilateral	0-4	<p>0: the central government or national electorate can unilaterally reform the region's constitutional relation with the center</p> <p>1: a regional referendum can propose or postpone reform of the region's constitutional relation with the center</p> <p>2: the regional government can propose or postpone reform of the region's constitutional provisions or require a popular referendum</p> <p>3: a regional referendum can veto a reform of a region's constitutional relation with the center</p> <p>4: the regional government can veto a reform of the region's constitutional relation with the center</p>
popweight	0-1	Population weight=proportion of country population in this region

Country ID	Country Name	Region ID	Region Name	Year-rows in the dataset
		15208	Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA)	1950-2018 (abolished 2018)
		15209	Subdistricts (tehsils, taluka)	1950-2010
		15209.03	Subdistricts in Khyber-Pak	2011-2018
		15209.04	Subdistricts in Punjab	2011-2012
		15209.05	Subdistricts in Sindh	2011-2012
		15210	Units	1956-1969
		15211.02	Metro corporation in Baluchistan (Quetta)	2011-2018
		15211.03	City district in Khyber-P (Peshawar)	2013-2018
		15211.04	Metro Corp in Punjab (Lahore)	2013-2018
		15211.05	Karachi metropolitan corporation (Sindh)	1980-2018 (year gaps)
		15212.02	Municipal corporations in Baluchistan	2011-2018
		15212.04	Municipal corporations in Punjab	2013-2018
		15212.05	Municipal corporations in Sindh	2013-2018